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liberalisation.International trade policies are often compared across countries and over time, using such
measures as arithmetic or trade-weighted average tariffs, Non-Tariff Barrier (NTB) coverage
ratios and measures of tariff dispersion.
1  But all such measures are without theoretical
foundation.  In this paper we develop and characterise a theoretically-based index number of
trade policy which provides a true benchmark against which all these ad hoc measures can be
evaluated.  We also present a sample application which shows that our index can be
operationalised and that it differs significantly from previously employed atheoretic indices.
Our index is the uniform tariff which is equivalent in trade volume to the existing (usually
highly nonuniform) tariff vector.
We call our index the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI), since it takes as
its starting point the Mercantilist preoccupation with the volume of trade.  Modern avatars of
Mercantilist thinking are everywhere, and their concern with trade volumes plays an
important constraining role in policy formation. Successive GATT rounds have interpreted
reciprocity in tariff negotiations to mean equivalent import volume expansion (defined as the
value of imports at fixed world prices).  The WTO goes further, sanctioning retaliation by the
offended party to displace a volume of trade equal to that displaced by the original offending
protection.  (See Bagwell and Staiger (1999) for a rationalisation.) Each nation presumably
faces domestic political pressure against tariff cuts and each pursues reciprocal strategies so
that imports rise in step with the imports of others. Subject to the reciprocity constraint,
which nation is cutting tariffs (against protectionist pressure) by more?
While concern with trade volume might suggest estimating the volume of trade in the
distorted equilibrium relative to that in free trade, this ratio would not measure  policy. 
Import volume could be much lower than in free trade either because tariffs are high on
inelastic goods or because though low they are imposed on highly elastic goods.  What is
                                                                                                                                                       
1 For overviews see Edwards (1993), Leamer (1988) and Pritchett (1996).  Bordo, Eichengreen and2
needed to guide multilateral negotiations is a conceptual framework within which the level
and the effects of trade policy can be distinguished, and this is what our paper provides.
The MTRI should also be useful for bilateral negotiations. For example, interest group
pleading and even U.S. government negotiators have focused in recent years on trade
volumes in auto parts and in semiconductors, as well as on aggregate U.S.-Japanese bilateral
trade volumes. The ubiquity of such examples shows that there is a latent demand on the part
of practical trade policy makers for measures of trade restrictiveness which take the volume
of trade as reference.
The volume equivalent uniform tariff measure has other significant uses in applied
economics. One is in the measurement of  implicit trade costs. Stimulated by McCallum’s
(1995) surprising revelation that the US-Canada border appeared to pose a big border barrier,
a literature has grown up recently which examines trade barriers other than those associated
with directly measurable trade costs. This work is primarily cross-sectional and uses the
gravity model to answer the question: all else equal, by how much is trade reduced by the
border (and similarly by language differences and so forth). The literature has yet to come to
proper grips with measurable trade costs in the context of measuring the implicit ones. For
this purpose it is necessary to have a trade policy index which holds volume constant.
2 Since
this work is inevitably done with rather aggregated trade (most often on total trade) the
appropriate measure of formal trade barriers is indeed the MTRI. A second possible use is in
examining the link between open-ness and growth. If the underlying model features
technology spillovers which are proportional to trade volume, as in Grossman and Helpman
                                                                                                                                                       
Irwin (1999) is a recent example of the use of average tariffs to measure trade liberalisation.
2 The dependent variable is some trade volume, which in general depends on the vector of tariffs and
a set of other independent variables. Using the full vector of tariffs  as independent variables is
impractical. The econometric analysis should ideally be based on aggregating the tariff vector such3
(1995), a measure of policy open-ness which is trade-volume equivalent is indeed the
appropriate index.
3
In Anderson and Neary (1996), we addressed the policy index number problem in a
different context, that of the welfare effect of trade restrictions.  We provided a rigorous
theoretical foundation for the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI), which operationalises the
idea of finding a uniform tariff which yields the same  real income  as the original
differentiated tariff structure.  We advocated its use in studies of openness and growth and in
other applications where it is desirable to have a measure of the restrictiveness of trade policy
which takes real income as its reference.  In the trade negotiations context, however,
comparing levels of protection with an index which holds constant the level of real income is
less appropriate.
4  Nations care about the effect of their partners' policies on their own
interests, not their partners' interests.  This need is addressed by the MTRI. We show below
that the TRI and MTRI differ considerably in their measure of the restrictiveness of trade
policy. Our working paper (2000) derives theoretical relations between the TRI and MTRI as
well as other tariff indexes.
 Similar indices have been proposed in the literature but none fulfils the same functions. 
Corden (1966) suggested calculating the uniform equivalent tariff and Leamer (1974)
examined a quantity index variant.  However, neither the Corden nor Leamer indices keeps
track of the disposition of tariff revenue.  Hence they are not full general-equilibrium indices.
                                                                                                                                                       
that the index does not change the implied trade volume.
3 The reasoning is similar to that of the preceding footnote.
4 An index of foreign country tariffs which holds constant the real income of the home country is
appealing in a two-country world.  In an n-country world (with n>2), this loses its appeal because an
index of one country's trade distortions can hold constant only one of its trading partners’ real
incomes.  Thus there would be n-1 different indices of each country’s trade policies, differing from
each other in complex and unintuitive ways.  A single constant-volume index treats no one trading
partner as special and is appealing as a summary of a country’s restrictiveness relative to the rest of4
 Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) and Feenstra (1995) develop an index of the welfare effects of
trade policy, but this is not appropriate for measuring its restrictiveness. 
Because of the widespread use of the trade-weighted average tariff, we begin in Section 1
by outlining its practical and theoretical deficiencies and showing the difficulties in relating it
to an index number of tariffs which holds real income constant, the TRI.  Section 2
introduces the MTRI and shows how it relates to the trade-weighted average tariff and to the
TRI.  Section 3 extends the MTRI to cover the case of quotas.  Section 4 presents the
empirical analysis, which uses a 25-country cross-section of data from around 1990, and a 5-
country panel of year-on-year changes from the late 1980’s.  We find that the MTRI differs
from both standard indices and from the TRI, often dramatically.
1. Average Tariffs and Welfare
Calculating an average measure of tariffs is an index number problem.  However, it is
inherently more difficult than the usual index number problem, where data on prices and
quantities at two distinct dates are available.  In constructing a tariff index we typically
cannot observe free-trade import volumes: at best we have observations only on current
imports and on current and free-trade prices.  This means that there are very few model-free
measures available.  One of the few that can be constructed, and so a natural starting point, is
the trade-weighted average tariff.  Section 1.1 reviews the difficulties with this index. and
Section 1.2 sets out the TRI and relates it to the average tariff.
                                                                                                                                                       
the world.5
1.1  The Trade-Weighted Average Tariff
Especially when data are particularly poor, it is not unknown for analysts to compute the
simple (i.e., unweighted) average of tariff rates across different commodities.  However, this
measure has obvious disadvantages: it treats all commodities identically, and it is sensitive to
changes in the classification of commodities in the tariff code.  Clearly, tariffs should be
weighted by their relative importance in some sense.  The simplest and most commonly-used
method of doing so is to use actual trade volumes as weights.  This leads to the  trade-
weighted average tariff, t
a:
where ti and ti (equal to ti / pi
*) are the specific and ad valorem tariffs on good i respectively,
mi is its import volume and pi
* its world price.  Note for later use that t
a equals the ratio of
tariff revenue to the value of imports at world prices.
The difficulties with t
a are immediate.  As the tariff on any one good rises, its imports
fall, so the now higher tariff gets a lower weight in the index.  For high tariffs this fall in the
weight may be so large that the index is decreasing in the tariff rate.  More subtly, tariffs
have greater effects on both welfare and trade volume when they apply to imports in
relatively elastic demand; but it is precisely these goods whose weights fall fastest.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these considerations in a linear two-good example.  Each panel
of Figure 1 gives the import demand function for one of the goods, with world prices
normalised at unity for convenience.  (Ignore point H and the associated dotted lines for the
present.)  As shown, the more elastic good 1 has the lower tariff.  However, if this
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result, the calculated trade-weighted average tariff would be lower than in Figure 1.  Yet it
seems intuitively obvious that trade would then be more rather than less restricted, since the
volume of imports would be lower and the welfare cost of protection (measured by
Marshallian triangles) would be higher.  Figure 2, drawn for the same demand slopes as
Figure 1, shows this from a different perspective: the trade-weighted average tariff is
declining in t1, the tariff rate on the high-elasticity good, when t1 is relatively high.
In response to the difficulties caused by using current import volumes to construct the
weights, some authors have suggested using instead the import volumes which would prevail
in free trade.
5  This view is well expressed by Loveday (1931), quoted with approval by
Leamer (1974): "The theoretically perfect weighting system would be the one under which
each commodity were given a coefficient equivalent to the value which it would have in
international trade of a free trade world."  But is this indeed the "theoretically perfect
weighting system"?  Using free-trade weights avoids the most obvious defects of using
current trade weights: the weights are not biased downwards by tariffs and the index is
always increasing in each individual tariff rate.  But otherwise the case for using it is not
compelling, in the absence of an explicit theoretical basis for measuring trade policy
restrictiveness. Moreover, the use of free-trade weights poses a major practical problem.
Since the free-trade import volumes are not directly observable, the informational
requirements of this index are just as great as those of the “true” indexes which we discuss
below: a complete model of import demand must be specified and estimated.
                                                                                                                                                       
5 Many other weighting schemes have been proposed, but none has a superior theoretical foundation
and all suffer from practical disadvantages.  Production shares give zero weight to tariffs on non-
competing imports.  Consumption shares, like import shares, may be low for high tariffs precisely
because they restrict trade so much.  Finally, world exports (suggested by Leamer (1974)) have the
advantage that they are independent of domestic tariffs.  However, this virtue reflects a basic problem
with using any external variables as weights: they take no account of the special features of the7
The choice between actual and free-trade import weights is identical in principle to that
between Laspeyres (base-weighted) and Paasche (current-weighted) indexes in any branch of
economics. In practice, some plausible compromise between the two (such as their geometric
mean, the Fisher Ideal index) is often used. However, a central theme of the economic
approach to index numbers (see, for example, Pollak (1971) and Diewert (1981)) is that the
choice between alternative index-number formulae should primarily be based not on informal
issues of plausibility but on how well they approximate some benchmark "true" index, which
answers a well-defined economic question.  Moreover, the use of free-trade weights poses a
major practical problem.  Since free-trade import volumes are not directly observable, the
informational requirements of this index are just as great as those of the "true" indices which
we discuss below: a complete model of import demand must be specified and estimated.
1.2  The TRI and the Trade-Weighted Average Tariff
We have already seen that an explicit behavioural model is needed to estimate an average
tariff with any weights other than those based on the protected trade flows. The same applies
when we come to specify a theory-consistent index. To define the TRI and to relate average
tariffs to underlying resource constraints and real income, we now develop a general model
of a tariff-distorted open economy.
6 
The economy is assumed to be in competitive equilibrium, with no distortions other than
tariffs, and with a single representative consumer.  Traded goods prices are fixed on world
markets.  (These assumptions can be relaxed at the cost of well-understood complications.
7) 
                                                                                                                                                       
country being studied.
6 Further details on the specification of the model can be found in Dixit and Norman (1980).  The
trade expenditure function was introduced in Neary and Schweinberger (1986).
7 Relaxing the fixed world prices assumption is a topic for future work. We believe there is a rationale
for a ceteris paribus trade restrictiveness index which fixes world prices even when these prices are in
fact endogenous.8
Private sector behaviour is described by the trade expenditure function E(p,u).  This gives the
expenditure needed to attain the utility level u facing the price vector p of traded goods
subject to tariffs, net of the income received from ownership of the factors of production. 
Spending and income in turn are represented by expenditure and GDP functions respectively:
In the background are factor endowments, prices of non-traded goods and factors (which are
endogenous given p and u), and prices of traded goods not subject to tariffs.  Standard
properties of the underlying functions (Shephard's and Hotelling's Lemmas) allow us to
identify the price derivatives of the trade expenditure function as the economy's general-
equilibrium utility-compensated (or Hicksian) import demand functions:
The trade expenditure function describes private-sector behaviour.  In the presence of
tariffs, we must add to this the behaviour of the government, which collects tariff revenue and
rebates it to the representative consumer in a lump sum.  The outcome of both public and
private behaviour can be summarised by the balance of trade function:
8
This differs from the trade expenditure function by the tariff revenue term, where the vector
p-p
*
 denotes the tariff wedge between domestic and world prices.  The economy is in
equilibrium when the balance of trade constraint is satisfied.  This requires that utility is at a
level with equates the balance of trade function to any exogenous income, denoted by b:
                                                                                                                                                       
8 All vectors are column vectors; a prime (')denotes a transpose; and a dot (￿) denotes a vector inner
product.  To economise on notation, wherever possible without compromising clarity  we omit p
*
from the arguments of B, along with the other exogenous variables.
(2) E(p,u) =e(p,u) -g(p).




The balance of trade function thus allows us to summarise the equilibrium of an economy
subject to tariffs in terms of a single compact equation.
We can now see why  t
a
 is not a valid general-equilibrium measure of average tariffs. 
First, if a uniform tariff equal to t
a
 were imposed, with utility at u
0
, private sector spending









Second, the economy would not be in equilibrium, since the balance of trade would not equal





0.  Hence t
a  does not provide a valid benchmark for
calculating a scalar equivalent to the initial tariff structure.
10
Can we devise a true tariff index of this kind?  Not only is the answer "yes" but it is
already available.  Anderson and Neary (1996) introduced the Trade Restrictiveness Index or
TRI, which implies a uniform tariff index t
D defined implicitly as follows:
                                                                                                                                                       
9 In contrast, equality could be preserved by defining a ‘true’ average tariff such that the expenditure
with the uniform tariff is equal to initial expenditure, and it can be shown that the true average tariff
exceeds the trade weighted average tariff due to the substitution effect (see Anderson and Neary,
2000).
10 The true average tariff defined in the preceding note has some legitimate uses.  It is the appropriate
index to use to aggregate tariffs across sub-sectors in order to construct an index of the average level
of tariffs facing consumers or producers.  It has been used in this way (usually operationalised under
Törnqvist or Cobb-Douglas assumptions) both in partial equilibrium studies (e.g., Aw and Roberts







This has a similar interpretation to the true average tariff, except that it correctly accounts for
tariff revenue as well as private-sector spending.  The value of t
D is the uniform tariff which
would ensure balance-of-payments equilibrium at the initial level of utility.  Figure 3
illustrates t
D for the linear two-good case, and shows that it has much more satisfactory
properties than the trade-weighted average tariff as the tariff schedule deviates from the
uniform: it is always increasing in each individual tariff rate; and it responds more rapidly to
higher tariffs on the high-elasticity good 1.
11
2.  The Mercantilist TRI
In the previous section we saw that the trade-weighted average tariff is a very imperfect
approximation to a welfare equivalent measure of trade restrictiveness.  But if our concern is
with trade volume rather than welfare, the TRI is then not the appropriate concept.  Instead
we want a tariff index which takes the initial import volume as its reference point.  Section
2.1 introduces this concept. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 compare it with the trade-weighted average
tariff and the TRI, respectively, and Section 2.4 relates changes in the index to changes in the
distribution of tariffs, all drawing on the results of Anderson and Neary (2000).
2.1  The MTRI
We wish to evaluate the restrictiveness of trade policy using trade volume as the reference
standard.  Let M(p,b) denote the import volume function, giving the volume of imports
valued at world prices when the vector of domestic prices of the distorted traded goods is
equal to p and the trade balance equals b.  Thus  M(p,b) is defined as p
*￿Ep(p,u), where the
                                                                                                                                                       
11 With linear demands in partial equilibrium, the welfare loss from a tariff at rate tion good i equals
(tipi
*)
2g i/ 2, where  g i is the price-responsiveness of imports of good i.  Hence the welfare-
equivalent uniform tariff t
D
 is defined implicitly by: ￿ (t
Dp i
*)
2gi = ￿ (tipi
*)
2g i.11
level of u is compatible with balanced trade:  B(p,u)= b. (The properties of this function are
given in Anderson and Neary, 2000.)  Then the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index
(MTRI) gives the uniform tariff t
m which yields the same volume (at world prices) of tariff-
restricted imports as the initial tariffs, M
0:
Figure 4 illustrates the MTRI uniform tariff for the linear two-good example.
12   t
m behaves
somewhat similarly to the welfare-equivalent uniform tariff (in particular, it increases more
rapidly in t1, the tariff on the more elastic good) but very differently from the trade-weighted
average tariff.
Obviously we get a different MTRI depending on which goods are included in the index. 
In international comparisons and multilateral negotiations it is natural to include all imports,
irrespective of trading partner and whether or not they are subject to tariffs.  (This is the
convention adopted in the applications of Section 4.)  Alternatively, in bilateral negotiations
it makes more sense to define the index as the uniform tariff which would yield the same
volume of bilateral trade.  For example, in U.S.-Japan trade negotiations, the MTRI for Japan
might include all Japanese imports and exports to the U.S., both distorted and undistorted. 
Separate indices could also be calculated for particular product groups (reflecting, for
example, concerns with bilateral trade in electronics or motor vehicles).  The only group of
goods for which the index can not be defined is that of all traded goods, both exported and
imported.
13
                                                                                                                                                       
12 Denoting the import demand functions by mi =ai -gipi, the partial-equilibrium import-volume-
equivalent uniform tariff  t
m

















2.2  The MTRI and the Trade-Weighted Average Tariff
Next we want to rank the MTRI and the trade-weighted average tariff.  In partial
equilibrium it is easy to show that their relative size depends on the composite elasticity of
import demand: the MTRI exceeds the trade-weighted average tariff if this elasticity exceeds
one.  To see this, return to Figure 1.  To locate the MTRI uniform tariff in the diagram, draw
the line Ge parallel to Bb, the import demand curve for good 1.  By construction, the level of
total imports be equals the initial level BG.  Hence the MTRI uniform tariff equals the line
OH.  This also equals the level of tariff revenue generated by the MTRI uniform tariff, abef,
divided by the value of imports at world prices (still, by construction, equal to JAFK).  Now,
recall from the discussion following equation (1) that the trade-weighted average tariff equals
the ratio of actual tariff revenue to the value of imports at world prices.  In Figure 1, this
equals the ratio of ABCO+ODEF to JAFK.  Hence, the MTRI uniform tariff exceeds the
trade-weighted average tariff if and only if it leads to a higher level of tariff revenue.  This is
equivalent to requiring the composite elasticity of demand for imports to exceed one, which
is what we wished to prove.
Of course, this argument is heuristic only, and needs to be extended to many goods and to
general equilibrium.  With many goods we need to be more careful in specifying the
composite import demand elasticity; and in general equilibrium, the assumptions of no
income effects and no cross effects need to be relaxed.  In Anderson and Neary (2000) we
prove:
                                                                                                                                                       
good or group of goods as reference.  Technically, the index is not defined over all goods, since (from
the standard assumption of no money illusion) when b equals zero the import volume function is
homogeneous of degree zero in the prices of all traded goods.  Neary (1998) shows how the failure to
select a reference untaxed good leads to misleading results in the theory of trade policy.13
Proposition 1:  The MTRI uniform tariff t
m exceeds the trade-weighted average tariff
t
a if: (i) the compensated arc elasticity of demand for the composite tariffed good
exceeds one; (ii) the composite tariffed good is normal; and (iii) the trade
expenditure function is implicitly separable in tariffed and other goods.
This proposition gives sufficient conditions only, and they are over-strong.  The basic insight
remains: the MTRI uniform tariff is more likely to be higher than the trade-weighted average
tariff the more elastic is the demand for tariff-constrained imports.
2.3  The MTRI and the TRI
No such ambiguity arises when we come to compare the MTRI and the TRI.  We show in
Anderson and Neary (2000) that, under very general conditions, they can be ranked
unambiguously:




This result can be explained intuitively as follows.  Replacing the initial tariffs by the MTRI
uniform tariff requires raising low tariffs and cutting high ones.  Since the total volume of
imports must remain fixed, this implies that the welfare cost of the tariff increases must be
less (in absolute value) than the welfare gain from the tariff cuts.  (For example, in Figure 1,
moving to the MTRI uniform tariff OH means that the welfare cost of raising the low tariff
(AB) on good 1 is ABba, which by similar triangles equals FGef.  This is clearly less than
FEef, the welfare gain from cutting the high tariff on good 2 (FE).)  Hence, moving to the
MTRI uniform tariff involves a rise in welfare; to keep welfare at its initial level would
require a higher uniform tariff than OH.
This is an important result, since it means that the uniform tariff calculated according to14
the MTRI logic generally under-estimates the uniform tariff appropriate when welfare is the
standard of reference.  (Figures 3 and 4 illustrate in the linear two-good case.)
2.4  Tariff Dispersion and Changes in the MTRI and TRI
So far we have only considered alternative measures of average tariff levels.  However, in
practical applications it is also common to calculate measures of tariff dispersion.  Once
again, these have no theoretical foundation.  Moreover, there is no obvious way of combining
them with the trade-weighted average tariff to derive a composite measure of trade policy
restrictiveness.  Figure 5 illustrates the trade-weighted standard deviation of tariffs for the
linear two-good example. It seems obvious that this conveys no information about trade
restrictiveness.
Nonetheless, it is intuitively plausible that there should be some relationship between
tariff dispersion and trade restrictiveness. The marginal welfare damage caused by a tariff is
proportional to the height of the tariff, so large tariffs are more damaging than small ones, all
else equal. Thus increases in dispersion which preserve the mean tariff in some appropriate
sense should be welfare decreasing and thus should affect the TRI (and the MTRI through
income effects). Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the effect of dispersion on the relation
between the MTRI and TRI for the special case of no cross effects and no income effects.
Start with a uniform tariff equal to OH (so t
a =t
m =t
D = OH), then introduce dispersion by
lowering t1 to OC and raising t2  to OD. By construction, the volume of trade and hence the
MTRI uniform tariff are unchanged. However, reversing the reasoning of Section 2.3,




. In Anderson and Neary (2000) we extend the approach of Anderson (1995) to
generalise this result: under very general conditions, small changes in tariffs raise t
D by more15
than  t
m   if and only if the appropriately weighted coefficient of variation of tariffs rises.  
3.  Quotas and the MTRI
Quotas are an important form of trade intervention in many countries.  Moreover, other
kinds of non-tariff barriers may often be represented as quotas.  The application of Section 4
includes many examples of non-tariff barriers treated in this way.  Thus it is important to
extend the definition of the MTRI to incorporate quotas.  For simplicity, we continue to
assume that all distortions are in trade only.
Let q denote the vector of quota-constrained imports, with domestic prices p and world
prices p
*; while m, p and p
* continue to denote the quantity and prices of tariff-constrained
imports.  As before, we seek the uniform tariff which would yield the same import volume
M
0 as the initial distortions {q
0,p
0}.  Of course, it would not make sense to deflate the quota
vector directly.  Instead, we apply the uniform tariff to the free-trade prices of the quota-
constrained goods.  (Anderson and Neary (2000) give a detailed justification for this
procedure.)  This leads directly to a generalisation of (7):
With the quotas reduced to their price equivalents, the interpretation of the MTRI uniform









4.  A Sample Application
The MTRI stands on its own as a theoretical benchmark against which the performance of
any empirical index of trade restrictiveness can be evaluated.  But, as with the true Konüs
price index in consumer theory, it can also be made operational if a specific economic
structure is assumed: in this case, an empirical specification of the economy's general
equilibrium.  In principle, the MTRI can be operationalised with only slight modifications of
any standard Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model.  But, in practice, most CGE
models are highly aggregated with respect to trade distortions and so are not ideally suitable
for this purpose. It is also desirable to use the same CGE structure across economies. This
will be highly aggregated in production both to meet data limitations for some countries and
to focus on the detailed trade distortion structure. In this section, we draw on Anderson’s
(1998) disaggregated application of the TRI, and use the same data and CGE model to
calculate the MTRI and compare it with the TRI and the standard indices. The CGE model
has a highly aggregated CES/CET industrial structure and a very disaggregated trade
structure. The model's main virtue is that it requires relatively little information about
domestic production structure, so a common model framework can be used across a large
group of countries.  At the same time, it permits the use of as detailed trade distortions data as
the analyst can find. We briefly review the model in the Appendix to provide a self-contained
treatment; see Anderson (1998) for details. We calculate the MTRI and TRI for both a cross
section of countries and for a few cases of year-on-year changes.17
Applications and their credibility are chiefly constrained by the paucity of detailed
distortion data.  Data on non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are notoriously poor, and there is also
surprisingly little systematic detailed information on tariffs and associated import volumes
across a broad spectrum of countries and years. The data were obtained by the World Bank
from the TRAINS (TRade Analysis and INformation System) database (UNCTAD (1996)),
supplemented by trade and trade distortions data supplied by country economists at the Bank.
 Non-Tariff Barriers (NTB's) are treated as binding quotas. This provides us with 6 digit or
higher Harmonised System (HS) trade distortions: the GATT/WTO upper bounds on MFN ad
valorem tariff rates and a binary variable indicating the presence or absence of a ‘hard core’
NTB.
  14 To reach consistency in classification between trade distortion and trade flow
classifications, we are forced to aggregate to the 4 digit HS level. We use atheoretic trade
weighted average tariffs in this aggregation, losing considerable information in many cases
(tariff variation within 4 digit trade categories is often considerable). To aggregate NTBs we
assign an NTB if 75% of the sectors in a 4 digit HS aggregated sector have hardcore NTBs.
By using the upper bound MFN tariff we neglect the important fact that many countries’
actual tariffs are below their WTO binding level.
15 We also neglect the fact that many tariffs
are specific rather than ad valorem, and hence have endogenous ad valorem equivalents. And
we neglect trade preferences and other exemptions which cause tariffs to vary by country of
origin. Errors are even more notorious for NTBs. Due to all these sources of error, we do not
claim to have accurate measures of trade restrictiveness. Fortunately, our main purpose is to
demonstrate the operationality of our theory and to show that different trade restrictiveness
                                                                                                                                                       
14 A "hard-core" NTB includes some restrictions which are hardly quantitative, such as being under
investigation for dumping.  It excludes simple licensing requirements.  See UNCTAD's description of
their NTB database for details.18
indexes give significantly different answers. Even inaccurate trade distortions data are
adequate for this purpose.
A key practical issue is the treatment of quota rents, bearing in mind that information on
domestic prices (and hence on quota premia) is not available.  In comparisons with free trade
(i.e., in Table 1 and Figure 6 below) we assume that rent-retaining tariffs capture all the quota
rent, so all NTB's are non-binding at the margin in the initial equilibrium.
16  Hence the policy
regime is assumed to be one of tariffs only, with quotas replaced by their tariff equivalents. 
In evaluating year-on-year changes (Table 3 below), we assume instead that binding quotas
generate rents which are entirely lost to foreigners or to rent seeking, apart from the fraction
which is retained by tariffs.  Alternative expedients (discussed in Anderson (1998)) lead to
similar qualitative results.
Table 1 presents the TRI and MTRI uniform tariffs, calculated using the CGE model for a
cross-section of 25 countries, with the trade-weighted average tariff and the coefficient of
variation of tariffs for reference.  Table 2 presents the results of simple regressions and rank
correlations between the columns in Table 1, and Figure 6 illustrates the data from Table 1,
with countries ranked by their trade-weighted average tariff.
The first observation suggested by Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 6 is that the MTRI uniform
tariff t
m and the trade-weighted average tariff t
a tend to move closely together on average. 
(The correlation and rank correlation coefficients between the two are 0.987 and 0.972
respectively.)  However, this does not mean that the two measures are interchangeable for
individual countries.  On the contrary, t
a underpredicts t
m in all but three of the twenty-five
cases.  The effect is not statistically significant (as Table 2 shows) and the underprediction
                                                                                                                                                       




m is only 8.9% on average.  However, it is important in a number of individual
cases, exceeding 15% for Austria, Indonesia, Morocco and the U.S.A.  This suggests that in
trade negotiations, most countries would prefer to use  t
a to evaluate their own trade policies
but t
m to evaluate their partners'.  On the other hand, for India, t
a overpredicts t
m by 7%.  So
the choice between the two measures is significant and of unpredictable sign in individual
cases.
     The second observation suggested by Table 1 and Figure 6 is that the TRI uniform tariff
t
D exceeds the MTRI uniform tariff by a significant margin: (t
D -t
m) /t
m is equal to 48.7%
on average.  We know from Proposition 2 that t
D cannot be less than t
m (at least when both
indices are generated by the same utility-consistent model, as here).  This theoretical
prediction is borne out for every case in the table.
17  The relationship between the two (with
correlation and rank correlation coefficients of 0.886 and 0.799 respectively) is weaker than
that between t
m and t
a.  The percentage divergence also varies considerably, ranging from
over 100% in three cases to less than 10% for Bolivia, Mexico and Peru.  Here too the
theoretical results of Section 2 provide some insight.  Anderson and Neary (2000) show that,
for small changes in tariffs, t
D rises by more than  t
m    if and only if the appropriately
weighted coefficient of variation of tariffs rises.  This suggests that the actual coefficient of
variation of tariffs might help predict the divergence between the two indices (since the
appropriately weighted coefficient is not available in practice).  The final regression in Table
2 confirms this: the percentage excess of t
D  over t
m  is positively and significantly related to
                                                                                                                                                       
16 Tariffs on NTB-constrained goods are in practice usually quite high.
17 The numbers in the table are given to only three significant digits, so in one case, Bolivia, the
values shown for the two indices are equal to one another.  From the raw data, the percentage excess
of the TRI over the MTRI for Bolivia is 0.22%, while the next smallest differential (Peru) is 0.88%.20
the coefficient of variation of tariffs (given by the last column in Table 1).  Overall, it is clear
that the two different purposes of evaluating tariff structures yield very different pictures of
the relative restrictiveness of nations' trade policies.
Table 3 turns to consider a small sample of year-on-year changes.  We now wish to
measure the change in the tariff structure from t
0 to t
1, and (as is often true) it is convenient
to avoid having to estimate the level of imports in free trade.  This can be done by extending
the definition of the MTRI given in  (8) to allow for comparisons between the initial
equilibrium (denoted as always by "0") and an arbitrary new equilibrium (denoted by "1")
rather than just free trade.  For convenience we present the MTRI deflator m rather than the
MTRI uniform tariff (where m=1/(1+t
m)):
Thus m is the uniform price deflator or "uniform tariff factor surcharge" which, when applied
to the prices in the new equilibrium, p
1 and p
1, yields the same volume (at world prices) of
tariff-restricted imports as the old equilibrium M
0.
Table 3 presents m along with comparable measures for the other indices: the TRI deflator
D=1/(1+t
D) instead of the TRI uniform tariff; and the ratio of average tariff factors,
(1+t
a1)/(1+t
a0), instead of the trade-weighted average tariff.  Thus, a value greater than one
in any of the first six numeric columns of the table indicates that, according to the measure in
question, trade policy became more restrictive between the two years indicated.  Because
(from the tariff-imposing country's point of view) tariffs on NTB-constrained goods serve the
positive function of retaining rent rather than the negative one of restricting trade, we report
average tariffs for these separately.  We also distinguish between average tariffs on






coefficient of variation of tariffs, and three measures of NTB restrictiveness: the initial level
of and the (arithmetic) change in the NTB coverage ratio, and the (percentage) change in the
volume of NTB-constrained imports.
In dramatic contrast to the results of Table 1, the MTRI in Table 3 differs considerably
from the standard indices.  This echoes the finding of Anderson (1998), where the TRI was
shown to differ dramatically from the average tariff and from all the other standard indicators
in evaluating year-on-year changes in policy.  There is a good reason for this.  In the
hypothetical leap to free trade, all standard indicators of trade policy move in the same
direction.  By contrast, in most real-world trade reforms there are conflicting tendencies
which make it even more important to use a theoretically based rather than an ad hoc index
number.  In all cases except the disaggregated average tariff on intermediate goods, the tariff
measures and the MTRI are negatively correlated.  The MTRI is more closely related to the
two measures of changes in NTB's (positively to the change in the NTB coverage ratio and
negatively to the proportional change in the volume of NTB-constrained imports).  Many of
the countries analysed had a high initial incidence of NTB's and were liberalising NTB's in
the years considered.
Comparing the changes in the MTRI and the TRI, the first columns of Table 3 show that
they always have the same sign, but no consistent ranking emerges between them.  In the
year-on-year changes, the MTRI and TRI changes are quite highly correlated, with a
correlation coefficient above 0.95. This is a surprise, since in levels they are not so closely
correlated and since for changes as opposed to levels it is quite possible for mean and
dispersion to move in opposite directions, amplifying differences between the two. Thus we
see  no reason to expect this pattern to persist with other data.22
The results overall show that the MTRI is much different from standard measures in
practice, enough to matter to practical policy-making.  In future tariff negotiations it should
be useful to come equipped with MTRI measures of proposed changes in policy.  Our results
also throw light on the appropriateness of using the trade-weighted average tariff as a
measure of trade restrictiveness in empirical studies.  Table 1 suggests that it may be
appropriate in cross-section regressions (though not as we have seen for individual countries).
 However, Table 3 suggests that in panel data studies, such as the estimation of cross-country
growth regressions, it is likely to be a very poor proxy for the two theoretically based indices
of trade restrictiveness.
Of course, all our estimates of the TRI and the MTRI are dependent on the model used to
calculate them.  Anderson (1998) reports that results are not very sensitive to elasticity
values, a finding which applies here as well since the same data and model are used.  The
insensitivity result is consistent with the folklore of CGE modelling --- elasticities do not
matter much but specification of the model does matter.  (For an illustration in the TRI
context, see O'Rourke (1997).)  It would be useful to have estimates based on different CGE
models to understand better the effects of differences in specification.  Despite these caveats,
the case seems to be made that the standard measures are likely to be very seriously
misleading in practice.
5.  Conclusion
Most economists who work with index numbers are familiar with some of the problems
they pose.  However, it is not widely appreciated that these problems are even more acute in
the context of international trade policy.  In particular, the deficiencies of the trade-weighted23
average tariff go far beyond those of standard fixed-weight indices.  First, the usual problem
of substitution bias is accentuated: highly distorting tariffs get disproportionately low weights
and the index may be a decreasing function of tariff rates.  Second, while it is true that the
trade-weighted average tariff yields a Laspeyres-type approximation to a true tariff index,
that index itself is inappropriate for evaluating tariff structures in general equilibrium.  The
problem is that it ignores the redistribution of tariff revenue, implicitly assuming that
compensating transfers are made to offset the loss of tariff revenue.  Remedying this
deficiency leads to the Trade Restrictiveness Index or TRI, which we introduced in another
paper.  But this brings up the third difficulty: while the TRI is the appropriate index when the
welfare effects of tariffs are considered, it is not at all relevant to the concerns of policy
makers and trade negotiators with trade volume.
This paper has introduced a new index number, the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness
Index or MTRI, which deals satisfactorily with all these difficulties.  It resembles the TRI in
two respects: because it is based on optimising behaviour it avoids substitution bias; and
because it is a general-equilibrium index it correctly accounts for tariff revenue.  It differs
from the TRI in taking trade volume rather than welfare as its reference.  The MTRI is
defined as the uniform tariff which yields the same volume of imports as a given tariff
structure.
18  Since the MTRI is a true index number for tariffs, the performance of empirical
measures should be evaluated in terms of how closely they approximate it.
Among our theoretical results, we show that the MTRI uniform tariff exceeds the trade-
weighted average tariff if import demand is sufficiently elastic, and that it cannot exceed the
                                                                                                                                                       
18 This definition is appropriate for comparisons of an arbitrary tariff structure with free trade.  More
generally, when two different tariff structures are compared, the MTRI is defined as the uniform
deflator which, applied to the new set of distorted prices, yields the same trade volume as the initial
tariffs.  The cross-section and time-series applications in Section 4 illustrate these two alternative24
TRI uniform tariff.  We also show how changes in the MTRI can be related to changes in the
tariff structure, summarised by two parameters, the generalised mean and variance of tariffs. 
Given the practical interest in measures of tariff dispersion, these techniques seem likely to
prove useful in many other contexts.  Finally, we show how the MTRI can be extended to
allow for quotas as well as tariffs.
We also presented an empirical application which showed how the MTRI can be
implemented using a computable general equilibrium model.  We found that on average the
MTRI is correlated with the trade-weighted average tariff in cross-section comparisons and
with changes in NTB restrictiveness in time-series comparisons.  However, it diverges
significantly from both in individual cases, to an extent which makes standard atheoretic
measures highly suspect in practice.  The empirical calculations summarised in Figure 6
confirm our theoretical results: trade-weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the
true height of tariffs, though less so from a Mercantilist than from a welfarist perspective.
We have concentrated on trade policy in this paper.  However, it is clear that exactly the
same problems arise in many other fields.  Measures of average taxes in public economics or
of average environmental distortions in environmental economics encounter similar
conceptual difficulties to the trade-weighted average tariff.  The theoretical techniques
developed in this paper can be applied in these areas.  We have made a start with our study of
the trade restrictiveness of domestic distortions (Anderson, Bannister and Neary (1995)) and
there is likely to be a huge pay-off to extending these techniques to derive appropriate indices
of policy restrictiveness in many other contexts.
                                                                                                                                                       
comparisons.25
Appendix: The CGE Model
The economy produces two final composite goods, an exportable not consumed at
home and a nontraded good; jointly produced with a Constant Elasticity of Transformation
(CET) production function, given the level of activity.  The inputs which produce the level of
activity include a bundle of non-traded factors of production in fixed supply;  a vector of
imported inputs subject to binding quota constraints; and a vector of imported inputs subject
to tariffs but not subject to quotas. A Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production
function relates the inputs to the level of activity.  The technology exhibits constant returns to
scale.   
As for consumption, the representative consumer's tastes are represented by a CES
expenditure function.  The final goods consumed are a vector of final imports subject to
tariffs but not quotas, a vector of final imports subject to binding quota constraints, and the
nontraded good.
Trade distortions are modeled as follows. All tariff revenue is assumed to be
redistributed to the representative consumer.  This  includes tariff revenue collected on quota-
constrained goods, where it serves to secure a portion of the quota rents.  The economy is
assumed to lose all quota rent other than that retained by tariffs: either to rent-seeking or to
foreigners via the bargaining power they may have in narrow product lines.
19  All nontariff
barriers are assumed to be quotas (or ignored as nonbinding). The economy is assumed to be
'small', facing fixed international prices. Exports are not subject to distortions and form a
natural numeraire. Any undistorted imports also enter the composite numeraire. In our
application, all imports are treated as potentially distorted.
                                                                                                                                                       
19 If domestic rent-seeking occurs, it uses factors in the same proportions as domestic value added.26
In general equilibrium, the equilibrium level of real income (utility) of the consumer
is determined by the balance of payments constraint, simultaneously with market clearance
for nontraded goods and factors. In reconciling income and expenditure for the balance of
payments constraint in our static model, net capital flows are made proportional to GDP. (An
alternative treatment of capital flows as exogenous makes little difference to the trade
restrictiveness calculations.) 
The general distorted trade model set out above is operationalised as follows. Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is equal to the value of the nontraded good plus the export good
(which is the numeraire) less the domestic value of imported inputs.  Consumer expenditure
is equal to the value of the nontraded good plus the domestic value of the final imports. The
base expenditure on the vector of final imports divided by expenditure gives the vector of
expenditure shares.  In the CES structure, the expenditure shares are a function of own price
relative to the CES price index. GDP is equal to the payment to the nontraded primary inputs;
this plus the sum of imported inputs gives the total cost of production. The base expenditure
on the vector of imported inputs divided by total cost gives the vector of imported input
shares. With the CES structure, the imported input shares are a function of own price relative
to a CES price index of input prices.
The quota-constrained imports have their domestic prices determined by market
clearance. With a large number of such imports (given the desirability of disaggregation), this
appears to present computational difficulties. Fortunately, the CES structure in combination
with the inelastic supply of quota-constrained goods eases the difficulty greatly. For full
details, see the user documentation on Anderson’s website (http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-
V/Anderson.fac.html).27
The model is implemented by combining national accounts data published in the
World Development report with the detailed trade and trade distortion data. In the base case
we assume an elasticity of transformation equal to 5, an elasticity of substitution in imported
inputs equal to 0.7 and an elasticity of substitution for final demand equal to 2.28
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New York and Geneva: United Nations.Figure 1:  Measuring Trade Restrictiveness:
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Figure 6:  Measures of Trade Restrictiveness for 25 Countries (%)















































































































































































































































































































































































fTable 1:  Alternative Indices of Trade Restrictiveness
Trade-Weighted t
D : TRI t
m : MTRI Coefficient
Country and Year Average Uniform Uniform of Variation
Tariff (%) Tariff (%) Tariff (%) of Tariffs
Argentina 1992 14.9 19.6 15.3 0.792
Australia 1988 10.8 16.6 11.6 1.004
Austria 1988 10.6 20.0 12.4 0.928
Bolivia 1991 9.4 9.3 9.3 0.140
Brazil 1989 16.1 23.3 17.6 0.816
Canada 1990 7.0 9.5 7.9 0.732
Colombia 1991 10.0 12.4 10.9 0.523
Ecuador 1991 6.5 9.5 6.9 0.759
Finland 1988 6.0 12.6 5.9 1.355
Hungary 1991 9.1 15.3 10.3 1.001
India 1991 16.2 31.6 15.1 1.495
Indonesia 1989 12.8 30.4 16.2 1.385
Malaysia 1988 9.7 21.0 10.2 1.106
Mexico 1989 10.8 12.4 11.4 0.469
Morocco 1984 7.1 18.5 9.7 1.676
New Zealand 1988 7.9 13.6 9.1 0.985
Norway 1988 4.5 8.4 4.6 1.340
Paraguay 1990 12.5 17.8 13.2 0.795
Peru 1991 15.8 16.0 15.8 0.149
Philippines 1991 14.2 17.3 14.6 0.506
Poland 1989 8.7 14.5 9.8 1.035
Thailand 1988 32.0 44.7 34.4 0.672
Tunisia 1991 9.9 18.6 10.4 1.294
USA 1990 4.0 6.1 4.8 1.035
Venezuela 1991 12.9 21.1 14.5 0.814
Notes:  All three tariff indices compare the actual tariff structure with free trade.
See text for details.
Table 2:  Regression Equations Based on Columns in Table 1
Regression Equation a b r Rank
t




D 1.1993 0.6179 0.886 0.799
(1.3096) (0.0674)
t







m on CV -0.2283 0.7838 0.896 0.626
(0.0801) (0.0811)
Notes:  a is the intercept and b the slope coefficient; standard errors are in parentheses;
r is the correlation coefficient;  and "Rank" is the rank correlation coefficent.Table 3:  Year-on-Year Comparisons of the MTRI, the TRI, 
Standard Tariff Measures and Two Measures of NTB Restrictiveness
Average Tariff Av. Tariff on CV Initial NTB Change in NTB % Change in
Country MTRI TRI on Final Goods Intermed. Goods of Tariffs Coverage Ratio Coverage Ratio NTBC Imports
No NTB NTB No NTB NTB Final Intermed. Final Intermed. Final Intermed. Final Intermed.
 Argentina 1985-88 0.783 0.783 1.113 1.059 1.048 0.956 0.200 0.035 0.779 0.574 -0.567 -0.411 66.1 35.5
 Morocco 1984-85 1.044 1.098 0.993 1.011 0.997 0.999 -0.327 -0.138 0.157 0.037 0.000 0.000 -13.8 -2.2
 Morocco 1986-88 1.044 1.028 0.961 1.053 1.142 1.142 -0.086 -0.742 0.164 0.030 -0.091 -0.005 1.9 15.9
 Tunisia 1987-88 0.877 0.913 0.989 0.982 1.033 0.989 0.030 -0.137 0.914 0.714 -0.320 -0.717 24.3 23.2
 Tunisia 1988-89 0.903 0.862 1.045 0.991 0.981 1.039 0.039 0.006 0.851 0.649 -0.101 -0.411 21.5 13.2
 Correlations with MTRI 0.955 -0.828 -0.012 0.264 0.679 -0.895 -0.687 0.897 0.789 -0.953 -0.841
Notes:   MTRI and TRI are in deflator form: values greater than one indicate an increase in trade policy restrictiveness





CV: Coefficient of variation of tariffs is the arithmetic year-on-year change.
NTBC:  % Change in Volume of NTB-Constrained Imports
See text for further details.